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INFITAH IN EGYPT: AN APPRAISAL OF EGYPT'S
OPEN-DOOR POLICY FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
GERALD T. McLAUGHLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a saying in Egypt that the Nile flows to the Mediterranean
and Europe, not to Africa or to the Middle East. Although a part of
the African continent, Egypt has historically turned to the Mediterra-
nean and the West for trade and commerce.' If these traditional
patterns were temporarily interrupted during the 1950's and 1960's, the
government of President Anwar-el-Sadat has begun to move cautiously
to realign traditional trading alliances. At the same time, President
Sadat has made no secret of his desire to make Cairo the leading
financial center of the Middle East-a position long held by Beirut in
Lebanon. 2 Unfortunately, because of Egyptian caution on the one
hand and an overabundance of investor wariness on the other, Egypt's
efforts to encourage the return of private capital to the country have
not met with total success. Because of political and historical realities,
the Egyptian Government has been slow to implement its open-door
policy; because of their worries about political stability and about the
future viability of the Egyptian economy, American, Japanese and
European investors have in turn adopted a cautious "wait and see"
attitude. The result has been something of a stalemate, with little
non-Arab investment returning to Egypt after the Nasser years.
To analyze why this stalemate occurred, Part Two of this Article
will outline the problems faced by the foreign investor in Egypt-
problems which have created wariness in the foreign investor.3 Part
Three will discuss the legal structure of Egypt's open-door policy
(infitah) which has tried to alleviate investor worries and attract
private foreign capital back to the country.4 Since Law No. 43 of
19745 with its accompanying amendments which were enacted in
* Professor of Law Fordham University School of Law. Professor McLaughlin spent part of
the fall semester of 1976 at the American University in Cairo.
1. The Khedive Tewfik in the nineteenth century remarked: "Egypt is not an African but a
European country." Kerr, Egypt Under Nasser 50 (Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association No.
161, 1963).
2. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 23, col. 1 & at 24, col. 1.
3. See notes 8-50 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 51-141 infra and accompanying text. Because of the dominance of foreign capital in
Egypt prior to the Nassser period, one author has characterized Egypt's open-door policy as a
"reopening." Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment: The Framework for Economic
Openness, 9 Int'l Law. 647, 649 (1975).
5. Law No. 43 of 1974, Concerning the Investment of Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free
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19776 is the linchpin of infitah, it will provide the central focus for this
analysis. Finally, Part Four of this Article will suggest reasons for the
cautious implementation of the open-door policy by the Egyptian Gov-
ernment .
7
I. THE PROBLEMS OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR IN EGYPT
At first glance Egypt seems to represent an ideal climate for foreign
investment. With its thirty-eight and one half million people,8 Egypt
has the largest potential market in the Middle East-a market that is
expanding at a rate of approximately one million, sixty-five thousand
people a year. 9 Although there are weakniesses in some areas, Egypt
also has the largest pool of trained middle-management and technical
personnel in the area. 10 Westerners, and particularly Americans, are
genuinely liked in the country and the government of President Sadat
seems dedicated to increasing trading ties with Europe and the United
States. Similarly, the reopening of the Suez Canal" and the potential
oil reserves in the Nile Delta, the Western Desert and in the Sinai and
Gulf of Suez areas 12 have contributed beneficially to the investment
climate. While these are all important "plus" factors, Egypt is still
plagued with political and economic instabilities which make the
foreign investor somewhat cautious.
A. Political Instability
The continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation forced Egypt to spend
approximately forty percent of its 1975 budget on arms. 13 The military
Zones, as amended by Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt) [hereinafter cited as Law No. 431 (copy on file with
the Fordham Law Review). Law No. 43 itself repealed an earlier investment law relating to Arab
capital. Law No. 65 of 1971 (Egypt), repealed by Decree of June 19, 1974, art. 4 (enacting Law No.
43). Special investment legislation also applies to the hotel and tourist industries. Law No. 1 of
1973 (Egypt); Law No. 2 of 1973 (Egypt).
6. Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt) (amending Law No. 43 of 1974 (Egypt)) (copy on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
7. See notes 142-52 infra and accompanying text.
8. Abdel-Meguid, Doing Business in Egypt, reprinted in Current Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in the Middle East-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran 166 (1977); N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1977,
at 8, col. 1.
9. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1977, at 8, col. 1.
10. Goekjian, Specific Problems and Unique Aspects of Doing Business in Egypt, reprinted in
Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East--Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran 179, 181
(1977). See also The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 26, col. 1. There is a "brain" drain of migrating
skilled workers, however. Id.
11. The Suez Canal was officially reopened on June 5, 1975, after it had been closed for almost
eight years because of the damage caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967. See The Middle East,
Feb. 1976, at 21.
12. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
13. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, § 4 (Week in Review), at3, col. 4;see Abdel-Meguid,supra note
8, at 170.
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presence is evident almost everywhere in the country. Various ar-
chaeological sites near Cairo have been taken over as military bases.
The length of the Suez Canal is heavily fortified; the Sinai Peninsula is
virtually closed off, and travel-at least by foreigners-is interdicted in
large parts of the rest of the country. Mohamed Heikal, former editor
of Al-Ahram, has prophesied that another war with Israel is inevit-
able. 14 Predictions like these, coupled with the obvious military pres-
ence and heavy spending for armaments, can only make a
foreign investor abundantly cautious. President Sadat's recent peace
initiative, however, has done much to alleviate military tensions in the
area-something which can have only a beneficial impact on business
prospects in Egypt.
If the potential danger of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities could be
discounted, the Egyptian political scene would appear otherwise sta-
ble. In a sense, Egypt has already gone through its revolution and
there has now been a return to normalcy.' 5 President Sadat has
restored a degree of political freedom to the country and in free
elections in November, 1976, the Egyptian voters overwhelmingly
chose a centrist faction of the Arab Socialist Union to rule the country,
rejecting candidates of the right and left. 16 In the same year President
Sadat himself was reelected to another six year term as President, 7 -a
clear indication that the move away from the socialist road of the
Nasser years has been institutionalized: But amid these optimistic
signs, there is still some lingering concern about the domestic political
situation. Food riots in January of 1977 forced President Sadat to
reinstitute government food subsidies for certain basic commodities.18
Although these subsidies constitute a serious drain on the Egyptian
economy, Sadat's economic advisers had to be overruled by political
realities. Conservative Islamic groups in the country have pressured
the Egyptian Parliament into banning the consumption of alcohol in
non-tourist establishments. 19 The ban is indicative of the continuing
influence of the Mosque in certain areas of government policy-an
influence which is a source of worry to non-Muslin business interests.
Similarly the reappearance of fundamentalist religious groups such as the
14. Heikal, Foreword to The Road to Ramadan (1975).
15. Goekjian, supra note 10, at 11.
16. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 5, col. 1; id., Nov. 7, 1976, at 10, col. 1.
17. President Sadat was sworn in as Egypt's President for another six-year term on October 16,
1976. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
18. For a description of these riots, in which reportedly over 40 people were killed, see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 1; id., Jan. 22, 1977, at 3, col. 3.
19. Law No. 81 of 1976 (Egypt). Conservative religious groups also unsuccessfully pushed for
legislation that would have prescribed the death penalty for Muslims who convert to Christianity or
any other religion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, at 31, col. 6; id., Sept. IS, 1977, at 8, col. 4.
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Muslim Brotherhood could lead to increased pressure aimed at un-
dermining the liberalizing policies of the Sadat government. 20 Al-
though political terrorism is not a significant factor in Egyptian life,
the presence of Libya's volatile leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, on
Egypt's western borders must always be remembered in this context.
Qaddafi is the reputed financier of various Muslim dissident groups in
Eritrea, Chad, the Sudan, and the Philippines. 21 He is hostile to the
present Egyptian leadership and has been linked to various violent
enterprises in the country.22 Finally, in recent months, there have been
indications that President Sadat's reinstitution of political freedom may
itself be undergoing some degree of modification. 23
B. Economic Instability
Realistically, however, economic (rather than political) conditions
pose the major obstacles to foreign investment in Egypt. While Egypt's
large and burgeoning population represents an asset in terms of
potential future markets, it has caused major social and economic
dislocations. Rural immigration to Egypt's cities has resulted in major
overcrowding and serious strains on urban facilities. Per capita income
in Egypt is $317 a year-among the lowest in the world; 24 the limited
arable land along the Nile cannot adequately feed the population and
Egypt possesses few natural resources which can be used to generate
much-needed foreign exchange. Large expenditures for national de-
fense have aggravated Egypt's already serious trade imbalance. 25
Imports exceeded exports by 1,200 million Egyptian pounds in 1976.26
In addition, Egypt must pay annually a staggering 1,200 million
Egyptian pounds in debt service for foreign loans. 27 This annual
20. One extremist group, the Takfir Wal Hijira Society, was responsible for the murder of a
formercabinet ministerand atleasttwo bombings in Cairo. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1977, § A, at2, col.
3. The Moslem Brotherhood is a fundamentalist Islamic movement first organized in 1928. The
Brotherhood had an estimated three million members in 1947. See A. Perlmutter, Egypt: The Prae-
torian State xv (1974). Although not nearly so strong at the present time, the Brotherhood is still con-
sidered a force in Egyptian politics.
21. The Middle East, Sept. 1976, at 25; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1978, at 2, col. 6 (Chad).
22. The Middle East, Sept. 1976, at 25. See also Egyptian Gazette, Sept. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
Recent developments between Libya and Egypt have led to a formal break in diplomatic relations.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
23. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1977, at 6, col. 2.
24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 27, col. 1.
25. See id., Jan. 29, 1978, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3, col. 4. Military spending had, however,
decreased to 25% of the total budget in 1977. Id.
26. The Middle East, Jan. 1976, at65 (1976 estimate).See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1976, at 58,
col. I (citing Egypt's three billion dollar balance of payments deficit for 1975).
27. Id. (1976 estimate).
[Vol. 46
INFITAH IN EGYPT
balance of payments deficit of 2,400 million Egyptian pounds repre-
sents a serious drain on the economy. 8
The Aswan Dam, although possibly an economic boon in the future,
may have exacerbated the already difficult short-term economic situa-
tion. Although the Dam has increased total agricultural acreage, its
elimination of the annual Nile inundation has reduced the silt content
of the soil. 29 To compensate for the lack of this natural alluvium, there
has been an increased dependence on artificial fertilizers. Fertilizers
are expensive and some claim that the average yield per acre is down,
thus effectively neutralizing the benefits of increased acreage. 30 The
disappearance of the Nile floods has also hurt the brick-making
industry in Egypt by forcing brick-makers to plunder rich agricultural
land to produce bricks, and thereby further reducing the productivity
of arable lands. 3 1 Although the energy potential of the Dam is enor-
mous, the existing energy distribution system is primitive and cannot
at present make effective use of this potential. The increased use of
irrigation as a consequence of the Dam may worsen the already
chronic bilharzia problem among the rural fellahin.32 With a yearly
population growth of almost three percent, limited natural resources,
and a spiralling balance of payments problem, Egypt faces a de-
teriorating economic future unless new sources of revenue can be
found. It is this overall bleak economic picture that frightens would-be
foreign investors.
There are some hopeful signs, however. A negotiated end to the
Arab-Israeli conflict would reduce Egypt's need to spend heavily on
armaments. Much of this revenue could then be diverted to more
productive economic investments. Because of Egypt's abundant reser-
voir of trained manpower, approximately one million Egyptians live
and work in other Arab countries, sending back over one billion
dollars a year in foreign currency remittances. 33 As the economies of
the various Arab countries continue to grow, Egyptian skilled labor
will be in even greater demand, increasing further the amount of these
remittances. The reopened Suez Canal brings in approximately 500
28. For a discussion of Egypt's dual exchange rate, see notes 83-86 infra and accompanying text.
Egypt has begun to impose checks on the worsening balance of payments problem. See The Times
(London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
29. The Middle East Observer reported that the National Agriculture Research Center of Egypt
was conducting studies aimed at finding a remedy for a lack of silt in the soil caused by the dam's
blockage of the Nile's flooding. Middle East Observer, Oct. 6, 1976, at 2, col. 6.
30. This information was garnered from the author's conversations with various individuals
knowledgeable on the subject of the High Aswan Dam.
31. The Middle East, June 1976, at 17.
32. For reference to bilharzia in Egypt, see, e.g., H. Ayrout, The Egyptian Peasant 73-74 (1963);
M. Rowlatt, A Family in Egypt 208 (1956).
33. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 27. col. 1.
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million dollars in yearly revenue3 4 and, when deepened to accommo-
date supertankers, earnings could reach one billion dollars by 1980. 35
Although critics argue that the canal will never lure back the bulk of
the oil trade, the Egyptian Government is more sanguine, emphasizing
the canal's strategic position between the West and the burgeoning
traffic in the Persian Gulf ports. Egypt's oil prospects have improved
over the past several years with the return of the Sinai oil fields and
with the discovery of new oil fields in the gulf of Suez, in the Nile
Delta, and in the Western Desert. Although it may never be a major
oil exporter, Egypt has enough oil resources for her own needs and it
has been projected that by 1980 yearly export revenues will exceed one
billion dollars. 36 Furthermore, the prospects for continued foreign
assistance are bright. The United States and various Arab and West-
European governments have pledged economic aid to Egypt to assist
in correcting her balance of payments deficit. 37 Unfortunately, even
the combination of these various positive signs has not totally con-
vinced private capital that now is the time to invest in the Egyptian
economy.
C. Lack of Foreign Exchange
A third investment obstacle faced by the foreign businessman is the
shortage of foreign exchange available in Egypt. 38 Because Egypt must
service huge government to government debts and import large quan-
tities of food on the one hand, yet has few sources of foreign exchange
on the other, there is a chronic shortage of hard currency for the
private investor. Thus, it may be difficult for the investing company to
obtain the necessary foreign currency to repatriate its dividends or buy
needed equipment or raw materials abroad. The Suez Canal revenues
and future revenues from exported oil will hopefully ease this problem
in the future. The return of foreign banks to Cairo is also an encourag-
ing development, although certain restrictions placed on the activities
of the returning foreign banks have hampered their making hard-
currency loans in the local Egyptian market. 39
D. Overloaded Infrastructure
During the Nasser years, the Egyptian infrastructure-telephones,
transportation, housing, and sewage-deteriorated substantially. 40
34. Id.
35. The Middle East, Sept. 1976, at 46. See also The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 27, col. 1.
36. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at27, col. 1.See also TheMiddleEast, June 1976, at56.
37. For references to American and European aid, see The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24,
col. 1. For a reference to Arab aid, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 27, col. 1.
38. See Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 171.
39. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 23, col. 1.
40. See Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 170.
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The foreign investor in Egypt today bears the brunt of this deteriora-
tion. The Cairo telephone system is in shambles. 41 It may take three or
four days to make a telephone call to Europe and even then there is no
guarantee that the call will go through as scheduled. Calls within
Cairo often are impossible during peak hours because the lines are
overloaded. 42 In order to cope with this situation, businessmen have
had to resort to ingenious measures. Some use messengers for inner
city communication. One company reportedly sends a messenger to
Athens once a week to make necessary phone calls. Some companies
have set up offices in ships moored off the coast to solve communica-
tions problems. Fortunately, telex communication is superior to tele-
phone communication and there are ambitious plans to increase exist-
ing telex facilities. 43
While air access to Cairo is good, port congestion in Alexandria is
notoriously bad, making it difficult to import equipment." While port
congestion seems to be a problem common to many developing coun-
tries, it may be more serious in Egypt because of Egypt's large
population and its concomitant need to import large quantities of food.
The reopening of Port Said may help to alleviate the congestion in
Alexandria, however. 45
Public transportation within Cairo is overcrowded and even danger-
ous. Buses tilt at perilous angles under the weight of people crowded
into and hanging outside of them. 46 There are occassional rumors that
some of these buses have tipped over from the numbers of people
hanging to their sides. To move around Cairo by car is an exercise in
nerve control. The traffic jams are monumental, the noise of horns
deafening-and all of this takes place under a broiling sun.
Housing in Cairo has not kept pace with the city's population,
making the procurement of office and living accommodations both
difficult and expensive. 47 There is also a chronic shortage of hotel
rooms, although many new hotels are in the planning stages. 48
Elevators in office and residential buildings are frequently not in
working order. Throughout Cairo, localized electrical blackouts are
not uncommon. 49 They may last several minutes or several hours, but
41. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 26, col. 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Middle East, June 1976, at 67.
45. For a discussion of the reopening of Port Said, see The Middle East, Feb. 1976, at 21.
46. For a picture of a typical trolley in Cairo, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 27, col. 1.
47. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
48. Id.
49. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3, col. 4.
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whatever their duration they are an aggravating reminder of the
deteriorated infrastructure.
For a company planning to resettle staff and open an office in Cairo,
these various problems will have to be faced and handled. Although
they are by no means insuperable,- they might still convince a foreign
investor to look elsewhere in the Middle East for a plant or office site.
E. Bureaucratic Rigidity
While it is probably no worse than in any other Middle Eastern
country, the Egyptian bureaucracy is bloated and inefficient. 50 The
normal problems of red tape are further exacerbated in Egypt by the ever
present threat of renewed hostilities with Israel. Simple bureaucratic
decisions may have military overtones-making the already slow bu-
reaucratic process even more cumbersome. For example, an architect
wishing to learn the force of the wind in Cairo so as to design appropriate
windows for an office building may find that obtaining such information
requires military approval. The rigid and cumbersome procedures of the
bureaucracy impose a remarkable inflexibility on Egyptian institutions.
For the foreign businessman, the most frustrating aspect of the bureauc-
racy is its inability to give definitive answers. Often two diametrically
opposed interpretations of a regulation will be given by different
bureaucrats. The administrative confusion is of course not deliberate but
seems to stem from an unfamiliarity with the complicated tax and finan-
cial problems which the foreign investor must resolve before deciding to
commit funds to Egypt. Although perhaps explainable in the light of the
Nasser years when Egypt was cut off from developing financial practices
in the West, administrative confusion contributes further to investor
wariness.
III. EGYPT'S OPEN DOOR POLICY
In Part Two of this Article, the obstacles presented the foreign investor
in Egypt were highlighted; Part Three will discuss infitah, Egypt's open-
door policy aimed at attracting private capital back to the Egyptian local
market despite the obvious risks and difficulties. As originally envisaged,
Law No. 43 of 1974 was to be the linchpin of infitah.5 1 Within three
years, however, various deficiencies in the law forced the enactment of a
series of compensating amendments. Because of their importance, Law
No. 43 and the 1977 amendments to it must be discussed in some detail. 52
50. See Goekjian, supra note 10, at 188. President Sadat in referring to the Egyptian bureaucracy
remarked: "It took us 5,000years to develop our bureaucracy, do not expect us to be able to dismantle
it in two years." Id.
51. On Law No. 43 as originally enacted, see generally Salacuse, supra note 4.
52. See notes 5-6 supra.
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A. Structure of the Investment
1. Local Participation
Article 4 of Law No. 43 of 1974 requires that foreign capital invested in
Egypt take the form of participations with either private or public Egyp-
tian capital.5 3 These joint ventures will usually take one of two forms: a
joint stQck company (socift6 anonyme), or a limited liability company
(soci6t6 i responsibilit6 limit6e). The latter form is similar to a limited
partnership. s4
The law does not place a maximum limit on the foreign share of the
joint venture.5 5 Thus the foreign investor can own in excess of 50% of the
joint venture. There are three exceptions to this rule, however. For banks
engaging in local currency transactions, the local Egyptian capital must
be at least 51% of the joint venture.5 6 Similarly, construction contracting
activities undertaken by joint stock companies must have at least a 50%
Egyptian capital participation.5 7 Finally, housing projects constructed
for the purpose of investment can be undertaken only by Arab capital. 58
For non-Arab capital to participate in such housing projects would
require the investment to be made through an Arab corporation. This
would be permitted as long as most of the capital of the Arab
corporation was owned by citizens of one or more Arab countries.
Although in the normal Law No. 43 joint venture there will be Egyp-
tian participation, it is possible in some cases for the Board of Directors of
the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones-the agency given
the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of Law No. 43-by a
two-thirds vote to approve an investment of foreign capital without local
participation.5 9
As a matter of good business sense, however, most foreign investors
will prefer to have some Egyptian capital in the joint venture. Since the
major segment of the Egyptian economy is run by the public sector, there
53. Law No. 43 art. 4.
54. See Goekjian, supra note 10, at 184. For a discussion of the French models for these business
forms, see J. LeGall, French Company Law (R. Pennington ed. 1974).
55. Law No. 43 art. 4; Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 169. But some amount of Egyptian
participation is required absent special authorization. See notes 56-60 infra and accompanying text.
The requirement that at least forty-nine percent of the shares ofajoint stock company must be offered
for Egyptian subscription, required by article I1 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt), is abolished for a
Law No. 43 Company. Law No. 43 art. 12.
56. Law No. 43 art. 3(vi).
57. Id. art. 3(viii) (added by Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt)).
58. Law No. 43 art. 4(a).
59. Id. art. 4(c). Foreign capital can "operate without local participation in investment banks
and merchant banks whose activities are confined to transactions effected in free currencies so
long as they take the form of branches of firms the principal offices of which are situated abroad."
Id. art. 4(b). In this case, no special permission is required. Id.
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will undoubtedly be heavy participation in these joint ventures by public
sector enterprises. No matter what the nature of the Egyptian capital
participating, however, joint ventures under Law No. 43 are still deemed
to belong to the private sector of the economy. 60 Being deemed in the
private sector is important because private sector status exempts these
joint ventures from a variety of laws and regulations which apply to the
public sector.
2. Management
The management of a Law No. 43 company is exempted from various
restrictions that would otherwise apply to an Egyptian company. For
example, the board of directors of such a company is not restricted as to its
size 61 or the composition of its membership. 62 A member of the board is
not prevented from serving in an administrative capacity in another
company, 63 nor is he bound by the normal retirement age. 64 Non-
Egyptian members of the board of directors are similarly exempted from
the prohibition against membership on the boards of more than two joint
stock companies 65 and from the prohibition against serving as managing
director of more than one company. 66 Law No. 43 does, however, limit
the transferability of shares in the company. Without approval of the
General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, shares are not trans-
ferable during the first two years of the project. 67
B. Approval of the Project
Even though it participates with local capital, foreign capital will only
be given the benefits of Law No. 43 if it is invested in certain approved
projects. In this sense, Egypt is not completely opening its door to the
return of private foreign capital. Only those investments which realize
the "objectives of economic and social development within the frame-
work of the State's general policy and national plan" will be approved. 68
Because Egypt is trying to move from a socialist economy to a mixed
public-private economy, careful planning during the transition phases is
considered essential.
Approval for a particular investment project must come from the
60. Id. art. 9.
61. Id. art. 12 (exempting Law No. 43 companies from article 21(1) of Law No. 26 of 1954
(Egypt)).
62. Id. (exempting Law No. 43 companies from article 28 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt)).
63. Id. (exempting Law No. 43 companies from article 30 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt)).
64. Id. (exempting Law No. 43 companies from article 33 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt)).
65. Id. (exempting non-Egyptians from article 29 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt)).
66. Id. (exempting non-Egyptians from article 31 of Law No. 26 of 1954 (Egypt)).
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 3.
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General Authority for Investment and Free Zones. 69 Realistically, how-
ever, the project application is circulated to several ministries, such as the
Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Economy, which have as their
concern the economic development of the country.7° The law specifies
general categories of projects which will be considered for approval. 71
The 1977 amendments expanded the original list of categories by adding
certain construction and technical consultant categories.7 2 Special prior-
ity will be given to those projects which are designed to generate exports,
reduce the need to import basic commodities, promote tourism, "require
advanced technical expertise or which make use of patents or trademarks
of worldwide reputation. ' 73 Because of its serious balance of pay-
ments deficit, Egypt obviously wishes to attract projects which will help
to correct that imbalance and assist the country in modernizing its indus-
trial capabilities. Export-oriented projects are particularly important in
this regard because they will help create much needed foreign ex-
change.
Although many foreign companies have presented applications to the
General Authority, few projects have actually become operational.7 4
There are several explanations for this. The first is bureaucratic. Al-
though approved by the General Authority, a project may still require a
variety of permits or commitments from various government agencies
before it can get underway. In the Middle East, the foreign businessman
will not proceed until every necessary permit has been formally delivered.
The Egyptian bureaucracy can be inordinately slow and one ministry can
often act at cross purposes with another, delaying and complicating
matters further. The second reason concerns the timing of feasibility
studies. Quite often a project application will be submitted without a
feasibility study. Since feasibility studies are expensive, a company may
first wish to obtain approval of the concept of the project before
making any outlays for a feasibility analysis. 75 After the project is ap-
proved in principle, feasibility studies may dictate that the project should
not be undertaken. Even where the project has been approved and the
feasibility studies are positive, many companies have been hesitant to
proceed because of the problems outlined in Part Two of this Article.76
69. Id. art. 1.
70. See Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 168-69.
71. Law No. 43 art. 3(i)-(ix).
72. Id. art. 3(vii)-(ix).
73. Id. art. 3(ix). For a brief synopsis of Egyptian patent law, see El Azub, Legal Protection in
Acquisition of Foreign Technology Through Licensing Agreements, 360 LEgypte Contemporaine
187, 196-205 (1975).
74. The Times (London), Oct 7, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
75. Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 169.
76. See notes 8-50 supra and accompanying text.
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Since few major corporations have as yet moved projects beyond the
approval stage, smaller companies may be holding back until the larger
companies take the first steps.
C. Nationalization
In deciding whether tb invest in Egypt, the foreign investor will
obviously be concerned by the possibility of the nationalization or
confiscation of his investment. The Nasser years proved that this was not
an idle worry."7 The 1971 Constitution of Egypt protects private own-
ership78 and Law No. 43 itself states that approved projects "may not be
nationalized or confiscated. '79 All seizures of the assets of these
projects-temporary or otherwise-must be effected by judicial proce-
dures.80 Although the Egyptian judiciary has been defended as indepen-
dent of the government, 8 1 many companies may doubt that, if push came
to shove, they would receive a fair hearing in the Egyptian courts.
Privately and publicly, however, President Sadat has labored hard to
assure foreign investors that the events of the Nasser years could never be
repeated in Egypt. Indeed, Sadat's open-door policy provides ample
mechanisms to resolve investment disputes in a fair and equitable man-
ner. Law No. 43 itself offers the foreign investor several forms of arbitra-
tion for dispute resolution-either private arbitration schemes or arbi-
tration within the framework of bilateral agreements with Egypt or
within the framework of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between the State and the Nationals of Other States. Any
arbitration awards would then have to be enforced in the courts of
Egypt.8 2
D. Asset Transfer
Egypt has a two-tiered exchange rate. 83 The official rate of exchange is
one dollar to thirty-nine piasters. There are one hundred piasters in an
77. For a brief discussion of the nationalizations of 1961 and 1963, see A. Nutting, Nasser
294-311 (1972).
78. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt arts. 34-35, reprinted in 26 Middle East J. 55,
57 (1972).
79. Law No. 43 art. 7. Various bilateral investment agreements between Egypt and other
countries often contain additional guarantees against nationalization. See, e.g., Egyptian Gazette,
Oct. 31, 1976, at3, col. 3 (discussing an agreement between Egyptandthe Netherlands). Law No. 43
does not, however, contain language as to the amount of compensation that will be paid if nation-
alization or confiscation occurs. The earlier investment law had such language. Law No. 65 of 1971
(Egypt), repealed by Decree of June 19, 1974, art. 4 (enacting Law No. 43); Salacuse, supra note 4, at
653.
80. Law No. 43 art. 7.
81. See Goekjian, supra note 10, at 187. See also Habachy, Doing Business in Egypt-
Comments, reprinted in Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East-Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Iran 190, 191-92 (1977).
82. Law No. 43 art. 8.
83. For a discussion of the official and parallel rates, see Area Handbook for Egypt 435 (1976).
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Egyptian pound. The incentive or so-called parallel rate is one dollar to
sixty-eight piasters. As originally enacted, Law No. 43 provided that free
foreign currency invested in Egypt had to be transferred into the country
at the official rate of exchange.8 4 The law was unclear as to the rate at
which the money could be repatriated. If currency had to be transferred
to Egypt at thirty-nine piasters to the dollar but could only be repatriated
from Egypt at the parallel rate of sixty-eight piasters, this would amount
to a 40% to 50% loss simply due to the dual exchange rate. 8S Law
No. 43 required clarification on this point. The 1977 amendments now
provide that money shall be both transferred to, and repatriated from,
Egypt at the parallel rate of exchange. 86 Thus, a dollar will both enter
and leave Egypt at the rate of one dollar to sixty-eight piasters.
Although the 1977 amendments successfully resolved this question,
certain other problems concerning the repatriation of capital and profits
were not resolved in as satisfactory a manner. Under both the original
and amended versions of Law No. 43, the general rule is that the investor
must wait five years to export his original investment; after this five year
wait, he may then export it in five equal annual installments. 87 Although
this general rule does admit of several important exceptions, it is still
possible that the foreign investor might have to walt a full ten years before
he could fully recoup his investment. In the case of profits, the amend-
ments to Law No. 43 state that non-export oriented projects can transfer
their profits only within the limits approved by the General Authority.88
Although fewer restrictions are placed on the repatriation of profits by
export-oriented projects, 89 it is clear from Law No. 43 that although the
open-door policy swings wide open into Egypt, it swings back less readily.
Although the repatriation restrictions are by no means intolerable, they
do make the investor more cautious in determining whether or not to
proceed.
E. Investment Incentives
In order to encourage foreign investment, Law No. 43 provides certain
exemptions from restrictive laws and regulations which would normally
apply to the ordinary Egyptian company.
84. Law No. 43 of 1974 art. 2(i) (Egypt) (amended by Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt)). For a
discussion of the problem caused by the dual exchange rate, see Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at
170-71.
85. Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 170.
86. Law No. 43 art. 2. Capital already transferred to Egypt before the 1977 amendments took
effect can be revalued in accordance with these amendments. Law No. 32 of 1977 annex A. art. 5
(Egypt).
87. Law No. 43 art. 21(i).




1. Import and Export Regulations
Article 15 of Law No. 43 exempts the joint venture from import
licenses with respect to material, machinery, equipment, and the like,
required for the establishment and operation of the project. 90 Similarly,
the joint venture can export its products without export licenses. 91 This
latter exemption was added by the 1977 amendments. Although these
exemptions do make import and export procedures less cumbersome,
they obviously do not solve the problem of port congestion in Egypt-
congestion that may delay the arrival of necessary machinery whether or
not import licenses are required. Although necessary equipment may be
brought into Egypt without import licenses, customs duties on those
imports may still have to be paid. The joint venture, however, can seek a
complete exemption from these duties or some form of payment deferral
from the appropriate authorities .92 The exemption or payment deferral is
made conditional on the machinery not being sold locally within stated
periods of time. 93
2. Employment Legislation
Law No. 43 exempts approved joint ventures from all legislation
specifically applicable to employees in the public sector and from certain
labor statutes applicable to all employees whether or not in the public
sector. 94 For example, article 12 exempts companies enjoying the privi-
leges of Law No. 43 from the provisions of article 14, paragraph 5 of Law
No. 26 of 195495 which requires a company to earmark 25% of its net
profits for distribution to its employees, the 25% to be calculated after the
company first earmarks 5 % of net profits for the purchase of government
bonds. 96 The exemption is not total, however, since article 12 does
require that some percentage of net profits of a Law No. 43 company be
earmarked for employees. The exact percentage, however, is deter-
mined by the board of directors of the company with shareholder ap-
proval. 97 The Model Statutes for Joint Ventures Established in Accor-
dance with the Provisions of Law No. 43 require that employee distribu-
tions follow a first shareholder dividend but precede any share of the
profits allocated as remuneration for the directors. 98 Similarly, article 10
90. Id. art. 15.
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 16.
93. Id.
94. Id. arts. 9, 11.
95. Id. art. 12.
96. Law No. 26 of 1954 art. 14(v) (Egypt).
97. Law No. 43 art. 12.
98. Model Statutes for Yoint Ventures Established in Accordance with the Provisions of Law No.
43 of 1974 in the Form of Joint Stock Companies art. 52, reprinted in Legal Aspects of Doing Business
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of Law No. 43 provides that Law No. 43 companies shall not be subject to
Law No. 73 of 1973 which provides for labor participation in manage-
ment.99 But again, the exemption is not complete because article 10
concludes: "The statutes of the company shall show the method to be
applied for labor participation in the management of the project."' 00
Thus, some form of labor participation is definitely required even of a
Law No. 43 company. The Model Statutes require the appointment of an
Assistant Administrative Committee to be selected from among the com-
pany's employees and workers-both Egyptian and foreign-when the
number of employees and workers reaches a specified number to be
determined by the company. 101 This Assistant Administrative Commit-
tee has the power to study various subjects but its recommendations are
not binding on the board of directors of the company. ' 0 2 In essence then,
Law No. 43 mandates some labor participation in management, but only
in an advisory capacity. Labor need not be represented on the board of
directors itself.
Article 11 of Law No. 43 states, however, that Law No. 43 companies
are not exempt from certain provisions of Law No. 26 of 1954 dealing
with employees and workers of joint stock companies and limited liability
companies. 10 3 These provisions create a ratio between the number of
Egyptian laborers that must be employed and their total wages as com-
pared to the total of all laborers employed and their total wages. Egyptian
semi-skilled workers must constitute at least 90% of the work force and
their wages must comprise at least 80% of the semi-skilled wages paid. 10 4
Egyptian skilled workers must constitute 75% of the work force and their
wages must comprise at least 65% of the total skilled wages paid. ls
Although Law No. 43 does not give the company a completely free hand
in determining the composition of its work force, the restrictions seem
with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States 111, 124-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Model
Statutes]. One commentator has stated that this exemption preserves the socialist principle but in
practice permits the company to minimize the financial burden it entails. Salacuse, supra note 4,
at 656.
99. Law No. 43 art. 10.
100. Id. In the public sector, workers' representation on the boards of directors would be in the
region of 50%. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt art. 26, reprinted in 26 Middle
East J. 55, 56 (1972).
101. Model Statutes, supra note 98, art. 33.
102. Id. arts. 34, 37. Law No. 32 of 1977 annex A, art. 6 (Egypt), requires the Minister of
Economy and Economic Cooperation to issue new Model Articles of Incorporation and Model
Statutes. Project owners, however, need not follow these models insofar as their provisions do not
relate to Egyptian public policy. It would seem that these matters of labor participation in the
management of the joint venture and the distributions made to employees (discussed at notes 99-102
sura and accompanying text) would relate to Egyptian public policy.
103. Law No. 43 art. 11.
104. See Law No. 26 of 1954 art. 94 (Egypt).
105. Id. art. 95.
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reasonable. From the perspective of a developing country, it is impera-
tive that its nationals be trained and employed. Foreign companies will
be required to assist in this endeavor in return for certain privileges and
concessions granted by the host country. Because Egypt does possess a
pool of skilled and semi-skilled workers, the requirement that 75 % of the
skilled work force be Egyptian is not excessively burdensome, assuming a
company hires judiciously. One persistent problem in this area, however,
is nepotism. Quite often a ministry or a highly-placed individual will
suggest a candidate for a position. The individual may not be the right
person for the job but it may be difficult to refuse to hire him.
3. Social Insurance Legislation
Article 11 of Law No. 43 does not exempt a company's employees from
the Social Insurance Law-unless the company creates a better social
insurance scheme. 10 6 The coverage of the Egyptian Social Insurance Law
is fairly broad, encompassing old age, disability, and death insurance,
labor accident insurance, health insurance and unemployment insur-
ance. 10 7 With respect to old age, disability, and death insurance, an
employer must contribute 15% of the employee's wages, the employee
10% and the government 1%. 108 In the private sector, health insurance
costs the employer 4% of the employee's salary and the employee must
contribute 1%. 109 Unemployment insurance costs the employer 2% and
labor accident insurance another 3%. 110 These different social insurance
programs will cost the employer approximately one quarter of his em-
ployee's salary. To be exempted from the provisions of the law, the
company must provide even more generous benefits.
4. Tax Laws
As originally enacted, Law No. 43 provided a five-year tax holiday
from the 40.55% Egyptian industrial and commercial profits tax only if
the profits were not subject to taxation in the foreign investor's home
country or in any other country. "' From the vantage point of an Amer-
ican company, this language was troubling. Since the United States taxes
American companies on a worldwide basis, profits from an Egyptian
subsidiary which ultimately were returned to the American parent would
be subject to United States taxation.1 12 Although the United States tax
106. Law No. 43 art. 11.
107. See M. Mahmoud, Investment Guide in Egypt 38-41 (1976).
108. Id. at 38-39.
109. Id. at 39.
110. Id.
111. Law No. 43 of 1974 art. 16 (Egypt) (amended by Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt)).
112. See Ball, Local Tax Considerations-Egypt, reprinted in Current Legal Aspects of Doing




might be deferred, the ultimate imposition of the tax might be enough to
negate the five-year tax holiday in Egypt. The 1977 amendments have
clarified this ambiguity-at least with respect to the industrial and com-
mercial profits tax and the tax on the revenues from moveable capital
(dividend revenues). The five-year tax holiday with respect to the indus-
trial and commercial profits tax and the tax on revenues from moveable
capital are no longer contingent on non-taxability by any other coun-
try. 113 Not so for the general tax on income which is a second tax separate
and apart from the industrial and commercial profits tax. 114 The exemp-
tion from this second tax is still conditioned upon such income not being
subject to similar taxation in the investor's home country. Exactly how
this provision will be applied must await future clarification.
Although an extensive discussion of Egypt's taxation of Law No. 43
joint ventures is beyond the scope of this Article, brief reference will be
made to certain other tax provisions. The five-year tax holiday can be
extended for three additional years by the General Authority' Is but the
request for this extended tax-free period must be sought at the time the
project is initially approved. 116 The 1977 amendments permit even
longer tax holidays for projects involving reconstruction, the establish-
ment of new cities, and land reclamation. 1 17 The taxholiday-whether it
be for five or eight years-begins to run from the first fiscal year after the
project commences operations. "18 Since start-up costs will undoubtedly
cause heavy initial losses, this provision permits a company to plan so
that the first year of its taxholiday does not overlap with this period of
heavy losses-a period when the exemption from taxation is of signi-
ficantly less value. Finally, even after the tax holiday has expired, there is
a limited exemption from the general tax on income for the profits
distributed by a Law No. 43 project. 1 9 Interestingly, interest due on
foreign currency loans obtained by a Law No. 43 company is
permanently exempted from all Egyptian taxation. 1 20 In structuring the
actual form of his participation in a Law No. 43 joint venture, a foreign
investor might wish to consider this provision carefully. A limited initial
investment coupled with substantial loans, the interest on which is free
from Egyptian taxation, could, under some circumstances, be the most
profitable method of investment.
113. Law No. 43 art. 16.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Ball, supra note 112, at 175.
117. Law No. 43 art. 16.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 17.




In addition to regulating the return of private foreign capital to the
local Egyptian market, Law No. 43 also provides for the formation and
operation of free zones-geographical enclaves where businesses can
operate as if they were not in Egypt. 121 The 1977 amendments to Law
No. 43 did not make substantial modifications in the overall structure and
operation of these free zones.
Under the open-door policy, two types of free zones are possible-
public free zones like Port Said where many companies may operate as
part of an industrial park, or private free zones where a particular
company could choose a location anywhere in Egypt for its own opera-
tions. 122 The Board of Directors of the General Authority is the supreme
authority controlling the affairs of the free zones. 123 The Board formu-
lates general policies and lays down the executive regulations to govern
the financial, administrative, and technical aspects of the free zones. 124 In
the case of public free zones, the Board will form a local board of directors
to operate the zone consistent with the general policies announced by the
General Authority. 125 Private free zones will be supervised directly by the
General Authority until affiliated with a public free zone. 126 By late 1976,
thirteen private and four public free zones had been established in
Egypt. 12 7
From the perspective of both the investor and the Egyptian Govern-
ment, the concept of the free zone offers obvious benefits. The foreign
investor can obtain approval for a wider range of projects in the free zone
than he could in Egypt itself simply because, by being in the free zone, he
is not competing in the local market. Storage projects or manufacturing
projects of any kind could, for example, receive approval for operations
in a free zone even though they might not otherwise meet the criteria for a
normal Law No. 43 project. 128 Once he operates in the free zone, the
investor is exempted from a wide range of Egyptian regulations that
would otherwise be applicable were he operating outside the free zone. In
a sense, the free zone company has a permanent tax holiday since Egyp-
tian corporate taxes are not levied against the project and exchange
control and capital repatriation restrictions are not applicable. 129 Ordi-
121. See id. arts. 30-57.
122. See id. art. 30 (providing for the creation of public and private free zones).
123. Id. art. 31.
124. Id. arts. 31-32.
125. Id. art. 33.
126. Id. art. 31(v).
127. Abdel-Meguid, supra note 8, at 169.
128. Law No. 43 art. 35.
129. See id. arts. 46, 49. Article 42 places restrictions on the withdrawal of Egyptian currency
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nary customs duties and procedures are waived and foreign employees
receive certain relief from Egyptian taxation. 130 Just as in the case of the
ordinary Law No. 43 project, the free zone company receives guarantees
against nationalization. 13 1 In addition, while non-free zone companies
are required to hire a stated proportion of Egyptian nationals, ' 32 the free
zone company is not subject to rigid ratios-although it seems clear that
some minimum proportion of Egyptian nationals must be hired and
appropriate training provided. 33
From the perspective of the Egyptian Government, the free zone
provides various forms of direct and indirect foreign currency revenue
since most of the transactions in the zone will presumably be handled
in foreign currency. First, the government will receive rent on the
property leased. Second, the free zone will employ local manpower and
presumably pay these employees in foreign currency. Third, Egypt will
be able to sell services or supplies to the businesses operating in the
zones. Fourth, the businesses in the zones may purchase raw or semi-
manufactured local products-such as cotton-for their manufacturing
needs. Fifth, the existence of a free zone will provide a place where some
products not available in the local Egyptian market can be purchased by
Egyptians. Similarly, because the free zone company must provide train-
ing programs for its Egyptian workers, 134 the country as a whole will
benefit from the skills learned by these Egyptian workers.
To analyze how the free zone system operates, Port Said, the largest
public free zone in Egypt, should be examined. At the northern end of the
Suez Canal, Port Said was largely deserted after the 1967 war with Israel
and was further damaged during the 1973 war. In May 1975 the city was
declared a free zone and, in the next month, the Suez Canal was
reopened.135 The Government of Iran earmarked $250 million for the
reconstruction of the city. 136 By the end of 1976, fifty-five industrial and
commercial projects were under way in the city. Because of the unique
location of Port Said at the Mediterranean entrance to the canal, many of
these projects were warehousing operations. ' 37 A shoe factory, a cement
works, and a milk production plant have also been established. 38 A wide
variety of consumer items from abroad can be purchased in the city.
from the free zones, but not on the withdrawal of foreign currency. Id. art. 42. See also Ball, supra
note 112, at 174.
130. Law No. 43 arts. 36, 47.
131. Id. art. 48.
132. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
133. Law No. 43 arts. 50, 54.
134. Id. art. 54.
135. The Middle East, Feb. 1976, at 21.
136. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24, col. 6.




Egyptians are permitted to come to Port Said to purchase goods but items
taken back into the country are subject to the normal Egyptian import
duties just as if the items were purchased abroad. On leaving the city and
returning to Egypt, an individual must pass through an Egyptian cus-
toms search which is thorough and exacting. However, the 1977 amend-
ments to Law No. 43 provide that the duties on goods brought back to
Egypt from a free zone are reduced by 50% if the item contains 40% or
more of local Egyptian components. 1 39 Although road access to Port Said
was severely damaged in 1973, the Egyptian Government is rapidly
repairing the major routes to the city. Normal urban services have been
restored and most of the original population has returned to the area. 140
Because of the success of the free zone project in Port Said, the city of
Suez, at the southern end of the canal, may also soon have a large free
zone. 141
Although many companies may choose not to do business in the free
zone-wishing instead to compete in the local Egyptian market-the free
zone will still be an attractive concept for companies wishing to set up
storage or processing plants in the Middle East. With ready access to the
Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal, and with a pool of trained labor,
Egypt will offer opportunities that other countries in the area cannot
provide.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Law No. 43 as initially enacted was criticized as only a half-
open-door policy, many of the early problems with the law have been
corrected by the 1977 amendments. But objections still remain-
particularly with respect to the restrictive provisions dealing with the
repatriation of capital. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect that
Egypt could change the policies of the past twenty-five years overnight.
Egypt is attempting to move from a socialist to a mixed economy and the
transition will inevitably be a tortuous one. But in judging the pace of
change, the investor must keep in mind certain historical and political
realities because these at least explain the reasons for Egypt's perhaps
overly cautious attitude towards the return of private capital to the
country.
In order to encourage Western merchants to live in the Muslim world,
it had become customary for Muslim rulers to grant foreign merchants the
privilege of being subject, not to Muslim courts, but to their own consular
courts. 14 2 As early as 1290 there was signed a commercial treaty between
139. Law No. 43 art. 37.
140. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 27, col. 1.
141. Id. Alexandria is also becoming a large free zone area. See Egyptian Gazette, Oct. 11, 1976,
at 3, col. 2.
142. See J. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt 1-5 (1968).
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Egypt and Genoa which stated: "If a Sarrazin [Egyptian] or a Christian of
a foreign state, has a litigation with a Genoese, the consul shall decide the
case." 143 "Actor sequiturforum rei" went the maxim-the plaintiff must
seek redress in the foreign defendant's forum. Over the centuries, these
"capitulations" or "gracious concessions" grew to such an extent that
during the eighteenth century, most foreigners in Egypt were subject only
to the substantive law of the country of their origin, and not to the laws of
Egypt. 144 As one commentator summarized the situation:
The consul's jurisdiction was necessarily confined to the enforcement of the laws of his
own country, except insofar as those laws expressly called for the application, in special
cases, of the foreign law. Therefore, foreigners were subject only to their own laws, as
such laws were interpreted by their own consuls. Thus, the laws of the country where they
resided, being unenforceable in any forum against them, became for them practically
nonexistent .... 145
In 1875, there were approximately 80,000 foreigners in Egypt. ,46 By
the" 1920's that number had increased to almost 160,000. 147 At various
times in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fourteen
nations had capitulatory privileges-privileges which covered the vast
majority of this foreign population.1 48 Since they prevented foreigners
from being punished for violating Egyptian laws, the capitulations
represented a major limitation on Egyptian sovereignty. Foreigners,
for example, could violate certain Egyptian criminal laws, such as the
narcotics laws, with virtual impunity simply because narcotics offenses
were not then recognized as crimes in the West.' 49 Although extremely
unpopular, these capitulations were not finally abrogated until 1937.150
The Western powers successfully resisted their abrogation for so long
in fear that their citizens would be tried under Islamic Law, a system
143. Id. at 3.
144. M. Howell, Egypt's Past, Present and Future 274 (1929).
145. Brinton, supra note 142, at 5.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Howell, supra note 144, at 276. This was out of the then population of approximately 15
million.
148. See Brinton, supra note 142, at 25. The list included Germany, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Holland, Portugal,
and Russia. After the dissolution of the political union of Norway and Sweden, Norway received
capitulatory rights. For the status of Brazil, China, and Japan, see id. at 25 n. i. The United States
was given capitulatory powers in 1830. Treaty with the Ottoman Porte, May 7, 1830, United
States-Ottoman Empire, art. IV, 8 Stat. 408,. T.S. No. 267.
149. The Egyptians criminalized the use of hashish in 1884. Decree of March 10, 1884 (Egypt).
The United States passed legislation controlling marihuana use only in 1935. See Act of Aug. 2, 1937,
ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970)).




that was considered by many in the West to be excessively harsh and
even brutal.15'
Itis in part because of the unpopularity of the capitulations, which were
viewed as instruments of Western imperialism, that the present Egyptian
Government cannot afford the appearance that it is attempting to entice
foreign business back to Egypt at any price. Any unreasonable conces-
sions or any preferential treatment afforded foreign business could
easily be branded as a return to the capitulatory system. Thus, Law No.
43 had to be cautiously implemented to avoid such criticism. In the
post-Nasser era, the charge of giving in to Western business interests
could have disastrous political ramifications. Consequently, on an issue
like the implementation of Law No. 43, where ideally the principles of
economics should prevail, the realities of politics must also be carefully
weighed. Viewed in this light, Law No. 43 is a realistic attempt by the
Egyptian Government to bring foreign private capital back to the
country. Although the open-door policy can be criticized as overly cau-
tious, the pace of change will necessarily have to be slow. It is, in fact,
amazing that so much has been accomplished in the space of just four
years. President Sadat and his ministers have so far been largely success-
ful in "de-politicizing" infitah. How long this will continue depends, of
course, on the shrewdness of Egyptian policymakers and the demon-
strated benefits of infitah. Unfortunately, Western business views Egyp-
tian caution-which is dictated by Egypt's internal political situation-as
a lack of commitment to infitah and, as a result, the amount of foreign
investment has been relatively small. Unless the Egyptian Government
can demonstrate the benefits of infitah, pressures will mount for a more
radical solution to Egypt's economic problems. President Sadat's con-
tinued commitment to infitah has, however, not gone unnoticed. The
new amendments to Law No. 43 have been a particularly positive gesture
by Egypt. There are signs that certain large American companies are now
seriously responding to the potential of the Egyptian market. 1-2 Although
there have been false starts in the past, prospects for success appear to
have improved in recent months. Once a few companies make the com-
mitment to Egypt, the psychological momentum will undoubtedly con-
tinue to build. When that occurs, the Nile will course ever more strongly
towards the Mediterranean and the Atlantic without fear of diversion.
151. See id. at 18 (referring to the fears of the Italian community in Egypt).
152. Egypt and the Ford Motor Company have signed an agreement for a thirty million dollar
joint venture to manufacture trucks. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, t977, at 9, col. 1. The agreement with
Ford could break the psychological barrier which has been holding up large company investment in
Egypt. See The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1976, at 24, col. 1. For a reference to Egypt's dealings with
Coca-Cola, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1977, § A, at 8, col. 1.
